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The crowding-out of private donations by government grants is an integral element in 
designing an efficient method of financing nonprofit activity.  This paper looks at elements of 
crowd-out, both the direct impact on donors and the indirect impact due to the response of 
nonprofits.   We include both a theoretical and empirical analysis of the reactions by donors and 
nonprofits to an increase in government funding based on data from the League of American 
Orchestras’ annual reports from 2004-2007.  To combat indirect crowd-out, renewed emphasis 
should be placed on grant design; for direct crowd-out, theories of collective action are 
appropriate. 
 
I.  Introduction 
The crowding-out of private donations by government grants is an important element in 
the financing of nonprofit activity by tax incentives and/or government grants.  At one possible 
extreme, if crowd-out is complete, tax deductibility for donations is superior to direct 
government provision.  If crowd-out is zero, tax breaks are efficient as long as the price elasticity 
of donations is greater than one.  If crowd-out is partial, the efficiency of tax breaks versus direct 
government funding is dependent on the level of crowd-out and the price elasticity of donations.  
A higher elasticity and/or higher crowd-out will favor tax breaks over direct government support. 
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The degree of crowd-out depends on the direct reaction of donors to the alternative 
funding, and the indirect reaction of donors based on the response of the nonprofit.  The direct 
reaction of donors is dependent on the substitutability of government funding for donations, the 
complementarities of government and private funding, the status afforded the organization 
receiving the grant (signal of quality creating crowd-in), the amount of warm-glow or prestige 
that is derived from donations, and other factors that arise as a direct response to a change in 
government support. The indirect crowd-out is a result of the reaction of the nonprofit to a 
change in government grants that influences donations.  Nonprofit responses include the impact 
of government funding on program output mix, commercial activity, and fundraising efforts.  An 
identification of the scope and source of crowd-out is an important element in both policy design 
and nonprofit efforts in supporting collective action. 
The paper proceeds with a review of the literature on the crowd-out of government 
transfers on private support, highlighting papers by Payne (1998) and Andreoni and Payne 
(2003).  These papers lay the foundation for the theoretical framework described in section three.  
Section four presents the empirical estimation of the model using data on symphony orchestras.  
Section five ends with an overview of the results and concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
Previous studies, both theoretical and empirical, find various levels of crowd-out 
depending on model specification, estimation methods, and industry specification.  Abrams and 
Schmitz (1978) test three alternative models of crowd-out:  the ultra rational case (complete 
crowd-out), interdependent utility functions (partial crowd-out), and the better-to-give-than-
receive hypothesis (minimal crowd-out).  Empirical results using a pooled times series of cross-
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sectional tax return data (Statistics of Income) indicate partial crowd-out, most consistent with 
the interdependent utility model.  Abrams and Schmitz (1985) provide a further test of the 
interdependence of the utility functions between donor and recipient using cross-sectional 
itemized tax return data.  The significance of recipient need (poverty level) and government 
transfers again support the interdependence theory.  Cornes and Sandler (1984) demonstrate the 
possibility that an individual’s charitable contribution may increase in response to an increase in 
public support when the good displays both public and private characteristics. 
Adding to the possibilities, Schiff’s (1985) theoretical framework provides for partial 
crowd-out of private contributions by government support, and also the possibility of crowd-in of 
charitable contributions.  The impact of government support on private contributions depends on 
whether government and private support are viewed as substitutes or complements, and whether 
the individual is satisfied with the current level of the public good.  Government support will 
unambiguously crowd-out private support only if the two types of support are substitutes and the 
individual is just satisfied or over-satisfied with the level of support.  Empirical results indicate 
that different types of government expenditures have different impacts on giving.  In particular, 
local government spending crowds-out charitable giving while state spending crowds-in 
charitable giving.  Likewise, cash transfers crowd-out private charitable giving while welfare 
spending stimulates giving. 
Steinberg’s (1987) unified model of nonprofit organizational support includes the effect 
of federal government on local government and private donations when all interactions are 
included.  Donors receive both a public and private benefit from donating to charity.  Federal 
government is exogenous while local government is endogenous.  The sign and magnitude of 
changes in federal support on private donations are ambiguous, depending on whether 
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government and private support are complements or substitutes, and whether the individuals are 
satisfied with the current level of provision.  Including the endogeneity of local government 
funding in the equation, the most likely outcome of an increase in federal support is partial 
crowd-out of the combined private and local government support, regardless of the impact on 
private support. 
Steinberg (1991) provides a survey of the previous estimates of crowd-out in the context 
of the level of government.  If local government is viewed as endogenous, structural models 
including local government as a regressor will produce biased estimators.  An alternative 
specification is to estimate the reduced form equation of private giving including only federal 
support, providing an estimate of the joint crowd-out from both federal and local government 
sources.  The entire reduced form system can be estimated, with the structural coefficients a 
function of the reduced form parameters. The structural model can be estimated using 
instrumental variables for local government.  If it is the case that information lags result in the 
current local government being truly exogenous, then the structural model of giving can be 
estimated directly. From a variety of studies Steinberg draws three major conclusions.  First, 
crowd-out does occur.  Second, crowd-out is relatively small.  Third, state government tends to 
mirror federal government, enhancing nonprofit support in spite of donative crowd-out. 
Kingma (1989) considers the problem of crowd-out from the perspective of the 
substitutability of government funding for private contributions.  Measures that use aggregate 
data measure the substitutability of government for private funds, with so much of private giving 
focused on religious organizations.  Measures of crowd-out, as opposed to substitutability, 
require industry level data.  Using individual donor data for public radio, his results support the 
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impure public good model of giving, with little differentiation made by the donor between 
alternative sources of support. 
Brooks (2000) and Borgonovi (2006) test for crowding-out or crowding-in using data 
from the performing arts industry.  Brooks (2000) considers the possibility of crowd-in due to 
leveraging at low levels of government funding, and crowd-out of private donations as 
government support increases. A quadratic specification of private support dependent on 
government support is estimated using symphony orchestra data, supporting this relationship.  
He argues that while it is in the long run interest for organizations to limit their dependence on 
government grants, the habitual behavior of private donations may result in an excessive reliance 
on government that is not easily corrected. 
Borgonovi (2006) hypothesizes that the relationship between the level of private and 
public support for American theatres follows the quadratic function as described by Brooks.  In 
addition, changes in public support exert a separate influence on private support that is strictly 
positive (and linear).  Disaggregating public support into federal, state, and local, the empirical 
results indicate that the impact on private support varies by the level of government.  Because of 
the size and allocation procedure, both federal and state experience a crowd-in effect, while local 
support includes both a crowd-out effect based on the level of support, and a positive impact due 
to increases in funding. 
 While most studies of crowd-out focus on the demand side of the problem, Ferris and 
West (2003) demonstrate that the observed patterns of giving and government support can also 
be explained by supply side cost differentials.  If the cost of delivering assistance is higher for 
the public sector than the private sector, then the observation of partial crowd-out can be 
explained by the difference in the relative cost of delivery. 
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Smith (2007) tests the crowd-out hypothesis on a balanced panel of nonprofit performing 
arts organizations under a variety of estimation techniques.  These include Tobit to deal with the 
truncation of donations at zero, fixed effects to deal with the unmeasurable organizational 
characteristics, and instrumental variables to correct for the endogeneity of government funding.  
On average, there is evidence of crowd-in, although the impact varies significantly by the type of 
organization.  The results tend to be very sensitive to the panel construction and estimation 
technique, but yield little evidence of crowd-out by government funding. 
In addition to the crowd-out literature, there is substantial work on the impact of 
government grants on nonprofit behavior relating to fundraising, pricing, commercial activity, 
organizational goals, and output mix. Examples include Driessen (1984), Rose-Ackerman 
(1987), Luksetich and Lange (1995), Payne and Andreoni (2003), Horne, Johnson and VanSlyke 
(2005), and Dokko (2009).   
Our paper focuses on the direct crowd-out of government grants and the indirect crowd-
out due to reduced fundraising, most closely following the work of Payne (1998) and Andreoni 
and Payne (2003).  Payne (1998) models the relationship between government grants and private 
donations to nonprofit organizations, focusing on whether government grants crowd-out private 
donations.  If donations and government grants are jointly determined, rather that sequentially 
determined, then government is endogenous and the single equation OLS estimator for crowd-
out is biased.  In this case 2SLS will provide a consistent estimator, dependent on finding an 
instrument that is highly correlated with government grants but not with private donations. Based 
on 430 nonprofit social service organizations, Payne finds no significant crowd-out under the 
OLS specification, and significant crowd-out ($.50 per $1.00) under 2SLS. 
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Andreoni and Payne (2003) follow up on the issue of crowd-out by including not only the 
donor’s response but also the nonprofit’s response to an increase in government grants.  They 
hypothesize that an increase in government grants will crowd-out private donations.  In addition, 
an increase in government grants will cause fundraising to decrease.  Considering both the 
reaction of donors and fundraisers, an increase in government grants will increase the revenue of 
nonprofits, but by less than the amount of the grant.   
Andreoni and Payne (2003) test the proposition that an increase in government grants 
will cause fundraising to decrease using data from arts and social service organizations. The 
initial results indicate a positive relationship between government grants and fundraising 
expenditures.  As with Payne’s (1998) analysis, if it is the case that government grants and 
fundraising are simultaneously determined, or that omitted variables are influencing both 
fundraising and government grants, the OLS results may be biased.  Using 2SLS the results 
indicate a negative relationship between government grants and fundraising expenditures, 
significantly larger for the arts organizations than the social service organizations.  The results 
support the proposition that government support reduces the level of private support indirectly 
through reduced fund-raising activity.  As is suggested in the paper, the next step is to consider 
the impact of government grants on private donations through the combination of the direct 
crowd-out and the indirect impact of reduced fundraising. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
Following Payne (1998) and Andreoni and Payne (2003), we model donor behavior 
based on utility maximization: 
Ui = Ui (Xi, Di, C) subject to:  Yi = Xi + Di + Ti 
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Xi ~ Private good consumption  
Di ~ Individual donation 
C ~ Charitable public good 
Yi ~ Individual income 
Ti ~ Individual tax share 
i ~ individual.   
The behavior of the nonprofit organizations is described by the following maximization 
problem, specifically allowing that nonprofits will adjust their fundraising in response to a 
change in government funding: 
Cj = Cj (Fj; Gj,Oj) subject to:  Cj = ij + Gj + Oj – Fj  
F ~ Fundraising expenditures. 
G ~ Government Grants 
O ~ Other funding and expenditures 
ij equals the sum of individual donations i to organization j 
j ~ organization. 
The individual derives utility from the donation itself and the resulting public good.  The 
level of the donation will be affected by the level of fundraising, alternative funding sources, and 
demographic, economic, and firm specific characteristics. This gives rise to a demand function 
such that: 
Di = Di(Gj, Oj, Fj, Yi) 
The maximization problem for the nonprofit organization results in a fundraising demand 
function such that: 
Fj = Fj (Gj, Oj). 
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Assuming that planned expenditures are based on budget projections from the previous 
year’s budget, we can substitute Ot-1 for Ot yielding 
Fjt = Fj (Gjt, Ojt-1) 
t ~ time. 
This implies a recursive system, such that the level of fundraising is based on last year’s 
budget and current grant opportunities.  The level of donations is then influenced by the level of 
fundraising, the current level of government grants, and demographic, economic, and firm 
specific characteristics.  The recursive system allows for identification of the direct impact of 
government grants on the level of donations, and the indirect impact of the fundraising efforts on 
the level of donations. 
Utilizing a linear specification results in: 
Fjt = α0 + α1Gjt + α2Ojt-1 + μjt 
Djt = β0 + β1Gjt + β2Ojt + β3Fjt + β4Zjt + εjt 
Z ~ population demographics. 
The simultaneous system is recursive, and there is theoretical support for the hypothesis 
that the error terms are correlated across equations.  In this case fundraising is endogenous and 
estimation of the donation function using OLS will result in biased estimators.  With the 
recursive model, an estimate of fundraising can be used as an instrument in the donation equation 
to produce consistent estimators, adjusting the standard errors to account for the inclusion of a 
predicted regressor. 
The direct crowd-out of government grants on donations is equal to β1 and the indirect effect 
of government grants on donations due to reduced fundraising is equal to α1 β3.  Assuming that 
government funding is exogenous, the fundraising equation can be efficiently estimated using 
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OLS.  Using the estimated value of fundraising as a regressor, the donation function can be 
consistently estimated using OLS and adjusting the standard errors.  There is still the question of 
whether government funding is exogenous, in which case the OLS estimators will be biased.  
While we have done some preliminary work in this area, it is not clear that the endogeneity of 
government support is as much a problem in the arts funding as it is in other sectors of nonprofit 
activity.  Borgonovi (2006) argues that government support of the arts in the United States is 
exogenous, as various panels at all levels of government make allocation decisions based on 
organizational quality or funding priorities, with private funding unlikely to affect the decision. 
As Smith (2007) points out, if the government allocation process uses criteria that also affect 
donations, and these criteria are not included in the donation equation, the measure of crowd-out 
will again be biased.   Andreoni and Payne note that the bias may be more a problem within 
social service organizations where “there may be shocks that affect government funding and 
private donations to the organizations similarly for which the other measures have not controlled 
in the OLS specification.” (2003, p.805)  In any case, it is very difficult to find an instrument that 
is highly correlated with government support yet independent of private support.  
 
IV. Data and Empirical Results 
Based on data from the League of American Orchestras’ annual reports from 2004-2007, we 
estimate the impact of government grants on both nonprofit and donor behavior.  The orchestra 
data is supplemented with ACS data from the census for the corresponding MSA relating to 
population demographics.   The estimation utilizes instrumental variables to account for the 
simultaneous determination of organizational investments in fundraising and private donations.  
Given the recursive structure of the equations, we first estimate the impact of government grants 
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on the level of fundraising.  The predicted value of fundraising is used as a regressor in the 
private support equation to estimate the direct impact of government funding on donations and 
the indirect impact of changes in fundraising on the level of donations1.  All models are 
estimated using fixed effects to account for characteristics unique to the community and 
orchestra that do not change over the survey period. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for selected areas of orchestra revenue, fundraising, 
and total expenditures.  Government funding is measured as unrestricted revenue from federal, 
state, or local government.  Private support is unrestricted revenue from individuals, business, 
independent foundations, and “other” (UA funds, voluntary associations, special projects, in-
kind, and miscellaneous).  The League of American Orchestras groups the orchestras by total 
expenditures; we have divided the orchestras into two subsections with the large orchestras (43 
total) comprising the largest two groupings and the small orchestras (96 total) the remaining 
groupings.  The large orchestras are those most commonly referred to as the “major” orchestras, 
having received the most attention in the literature.  The statistics are shown for the entire group 
of orchestras, and separately for the large and small orchestras over the period 2004-2007 to see 
if there are any major differences in funding behavior by orchestra size.  Studies such as 
Luksetich and Lange (1995) have demonstrated that the size of the orchestra has an impact on 
the organizational goals and also the effectiveness of fundraising activities.  The averages for the 
groups reveal that symphony orchestras receive very little funding from government sources; 
federal government support amounts to less than one percent of the average budget. The smaller 
orchestras are much more reliant on private donations than the larger orchestras, and the larger 
                                                          




orchestras receive much greater support from investment income.  Fundraising expenditures 
absorb about an equal portion of the budget between the large and small orchestras. 
<Insert Table 1 Approximately Here> 
Table 2 displays the results of regressing fundraising expenditures on government 
support, highlighting the separate levels of support from local, state, and federal sources.  
Previous research indicates that the level of government support matters, although the 
differences are highly dependent on the particular sector, the amount of support, the type of 
support, and the allocation procedure used by each level of government.  Although the 
coefficients on federal and local government expenditures are insignificant, the coefficient on 
state government support is negative and significant indicating a negative impact on fundraising.  
Investment income is also associated with a negative and significant impact on fundraising 
expenditures.  Last year’s fundraising expenditures are a significant predictor of this year’s for 
the smaller orchestras, although surprisingly insignificant for the larger orchestras. 
<Insert Table 2 Approximately Here> 
Table 3 presents the results of regressing total private support on government grants, 
investment income, fundraising expenditures, and local demographics. The column labeled 4-
year includes actual fundraising expenditures over the sample period 2004-2007.  The column 
labeled 3-year includes actual fundraising expenditures over the period 2005-2007 for 
comparison to the IV estimation.  The IV-equation uses the estimated value of fundraising from 
table 1 over the period 2005-2007, the year 2004 is excluded due to the lagged value of 
expenditures used in the fundraising equation. 
<Insert Table 3 Approximately Here> 
14 
 
Comparing 3-year and IV-expfund, the results are very similar when taking account both 
the direct and indirect impact of government and investment income on private support.  The 3-
year results and the results from the IV estimates are, in each case, the same sign and the same 
order of magnitude.   
Impact of federal government support on private support: 
3-Year Sample Results:  Combined impact = 2.32733 
IV-Expfund:  Direct + Indirect = 1.807 + (.007)(-4.098) = 1.778 
Impact of state government support on private support: 
3-Year Sample Results: Combined Impact = 0.282494 
IV-Expfund:  Direct + Indirect = -0.341 + (-.155)(-4.098) = 0.295 
Impact of local government support on private support: 
3-Year Sample Results:  Combined impact = 2.198038 
IV-Expfund:  Direct + Indirect = 2.302 + (.023)(-4.098) = 2.207 
Impact of investment income on private support: 
3-Year Sample Results:  Combined impact = -.04349 
IV-Expfund: Direct + Indirect = -.075 + (-.005)(-4.098) = -0.051 
The direct impact of local government support on private support is positive, indicating a 
crowd-in effect, while the direct impact of investment income on private support is negative, 
indicating a crowd-out effect.  The combined impact on private support results in crowd-in for 
government support and crowd-out for investment income. If investment income is great and 
growing the charity and its board and donors may see fundraising as less of an imperative and 




Table 4 presents estimates of the impact of government support on private support, 
separating the larger and the smaller orchestras in the estimation.  The League of American 
Orchestras groups the orchestras by total expenditures, the “larger” orchestras include the top 
two groupings containing the largest 43 orchestras by total expenditure.  The “small” orchestra 
grouping contains the remaining 96 orchestras. 
<Insert Table 4 Approximately Here> 
The impact of government funding on private support is significantly different for large 
orchestras versus small orchestras.  Larger orchestras appear to experience more of a crowding-
in effect, while smaller orchestras more of a crowding-out effect.  Local government funding has 
a positive and significant effect on large orchestras. For small orchestras, federal support shows a 
significant and negative impact.   For all orchestras, investment income is inversely related to 
fundraising success.  This suggests that the charities with successful investment income streams 
either scale back their fundraising efforts and/or their donors are skeptical that the charities need 
their philanthropic support.   
Tables 5a and 5b present the impact of government support on private support, 
disaggregating private support into the categories of individual, business, foundation, and other 
private sources.  The models are run separately for large and small orchestras based on the 
differences observed in Table 4.  The columns corresponding to total private support in tables 5a 
and 5b correspond to the IV-Expend columns in table 4; these are duplicated for an easier 
comparison to the individual categories of support displayed in tables 5a and 5b.  
Table 6 shows the full impact of government and investment income on each of the 
categories of private support, combining the direct effect on funders and the indirect effect 
through changes in fundraising as estimated in tables 2, 5a, and 5b. 
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<Insert Table 5a, 5b, 6 Approximately Here> 
Individual support most closely mirrors the results of total support in terms of crowd-out, 
particularly for the larger orchestras.  Government support has a positive effect on individual 
giving to the larger orchestras, especially true for local government.  The direct crowd-in is 
2.61:1, and the combined impact is only slightly less. Foundation giving to the larger orchestras 
experiences crowding-out by local government, with a direct negative impact of (0.5):1 and an 
overall negative impact of (0.67):1.  While the impact of investment income is negative for total 
private giving, it is only significant for private foundation giving. 
The impact of government support on private support for smaller orchestras shows a mixture 
of crowd-out and crowd-in depending on the level of government and type of private support.  In 
general, federal tends to have more of a crowd-out effect, state more of a crowd-in effect, and 
local much more mixed.  The business sector responds favorably to government support; the 
direct impact of state funding on business support is positive and significant, 0.3:1.  Foundations 
also respond favorably to state support, 1.43:1, but negatively to federal support (3.73):1.  The 
direct impact of investment income is consistently negative  (with the exception of “other” 
support), although significant only in the case of individual support. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The importance of crowd-out involves the financial security and policy alternatives to 
support nonprofit collective action.  The ability of nonprofits to adjust to cuts in government 
grants relies heavily on an increase in private support. Particularly in recessionary periods, 
decreases in government support may need to be supplemented by financial buffers in the form 
of net asset balances and investments.   
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If crowding-out of private support by government support is severely negating the intended 
stimulus to nonprofit organizations, then understanding the source of the crowd-out is necessary 
to overcome the problem. If crowding-out is due to the internal reactions of the nonprofit, some 
aspect of grant redesign may be appropriate, such as stipulating matching requirements or other 
restrictions.  If the crowd-out is a direct response of individuals to the increased government 
support, it may be more appropriate to focus on theories of fund-raising, social pressure, and 
individual preferences as it concerns the aspect of free-riding. 
Our results indicate that the direct impact of government spending on orchestra finances 
varies substantially by the level of government.  For larger orchestras the direct impact of federal 
and local government support is positive, and for state support negative.  For smaller orchestras 
it is the opposite; federal and local have a negative direct impact, and state a positive direct 
impact on total private giving. 
Referring back to table 2, the indirect effect of government support on private support is a 
significant issue in regards to state support for smaller orchestras.  This is the one area that 
government support has a significant and negative impact on fundraising.  This would make 
sense in that the direct impact of state support positively impacts private giving, lessening the 
need for fundraising.  The decrease in fundraising causes the impact of state support on private 
giving to fall from $1.01 to $.46 for each dollar of support (See tables 5.b and 6). 
For the larger orchestras, investment income has a significant impact on fundraising, causing the 
indirect crowd-out.  The reliance on investment income is much greater for the larger orchestras 
than the smaller orchestras (20% vs. 7.7%) and seems to lessen the need for fundraising.  As with 
the smaller orchestras government support is a small part of the budget; in this case its impact on 
fundraising is insignificant.   
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The impact of government support on private giving also varies significantly by the 
source of private giving.  For the larger orchestras, local government support reinforces 
individual giving by a factor of 2.6:1, but crowds-out foundation giving by a factor of (0.5):1.  
Business support does not seem to be significantly affected by government support.  With the 
exception of “other” private support, neither federal nor state support has a direct impact on 
private support from individuals, business, or foundations.   
For the smaller orchestras, the impact of government support on the various components 
of private giving is much different.  The only significant influences are associated with business 
and foundation giving.  For business support, there is a direct crowd-in of 0.3:1 from state 
government support.  Foundation giving also experiences crowd-in from state giving by a factor 
of 1.43:1.  There is a significant negative crowd-out of foundation giving from federal 
government of (3.73):1, however.  Local government has no significant impact on any areas of 
private support for the smaller orchestras. 
The above discussion illustrates the intricacies involved in the funding relationships for 
nonprofit organizations.  One thing is clear: the crowd out debate for orchestras is complex.  The 
reality is that crowding in/out varies by the size of the orchestra, by the source of philanthropic 
support (total, individuals, businesses, foundations, and all other), and perhaps most importantly 
by the type of government funding.  Given the extent of crowding-in that is occurring orchestras 
have been relatively successful at combating the crowding-out and reinforcing the positive 
funding relationships that exist.  The one exception tends to be with foundation giving, which 
experiences some significant crowding-out from government support.  The impact on fundraising 
from investment income and/or state support is also a source of indirect crowd-out, which may in 
fact be viewed favorably. By lessening the need for fundraising, nonprofits can dedicate more of 
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their time and resources to promoting the mission of the organization.  They may not be working 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 2004-2007 
    
       All orchestras 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
%Exptot 
Mean 
Total Expenditures 502 9454357 1.60E+07 19270 8.85E+07 
 Govt Support (GS) - local 502 170634.5 432307.1 0 5405691 1.80% 
Govt. Support (GS) - state 502 168162.9 467511 0 2906000 1.78% 
Govt. Support (GS) - federal 502 31663.78 153691.6 0 1763848 0.33% 
Investment Income 502 1752810 6125664 -2.83E+07 5.14E+07 18.54% 
Total Private Support (PS) 502 3494544 4878702 18100 2.54E+07 36.96% 
PS - Individual 502 1587367 2526659 1565 1.57E+07 16.79% 
PS - Business 502 547742.1 787910.2 0 4742418 5.79% 
PS - Foundation 502 495625.1 921941.4 0 1.09E+07 5.24% 
PS- Other 502 863810 1468076 0 1.18E+07 9.14% 
Fundraising Expenditure 502 528833.8 945238 0 6478152 5.59% 
       Large orchestras 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
%Exptot 
Mean 
Total Expenditures 164 2.51E+07 2.03E+07 5629936 8.85E+07 
 Govt Support (GS) - local 164 445010.4 672574.7 0 5405691 1.77% 
Govt. Support (GS) - state 164 438162.6 747713.8 0 2906000 1.75% 
Govt. Support (GS) - federal 164 87770.87 260283.7 0 1763848 0.35% 
Investment Income 164 5072868 9936150 -2.83E+07 5.14E+07 20.21% 
Total Private Support (PS) 164 8862290 5393930 1873000 2.54E+07 35.31% 
PS - Individual 164 4138914 3108107 620523 1.57E+07 16.49% 
PS - Business 164 1341498 965600.3 0 4742418 5.34% 
PS - Foundation 164 1264264 1294479 0 1.09E+07 5.04% 
PS - Other 164 2117613 2032536 125000 1.18E+07 8.44% 
Fundraising Expenditure 164 1400467 1260175 0 6478152 5.58% 
       Small orchestras 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
%Exptot 
Mean 
Total Expenditures 338 1841920 1459827 19270 6982035 
 Govt Support (GS) - local 338 37505.34 68052.8 0 400280 2.04% 
Govt. Support (GS) - state 338 37157.04 42752.5 0 400280 2.02% 
Govt. Support (GS) - federal 338 4440.216 8535.394 0 65000 0.24% 
Investment Income 338 141895 255663.6 -179302 2842562 7.70% 
Total Private Support (PS) 338 890075.6 698125.7 18100 5023183 48.32% 
PS - Individual 338 349337.4 335759.1 1565 1894344 18.97% 
PS - Business 338 162605.9 128676.3 2565 980326 8.83% 
PS - Foundation 338 122676.2 161576.8 0 1030036 6.66% 
PS - Other 338 255456 264011.6 0 2968766 13.87% 





Table 2:  Regression Fundraising Expenditures  
    
       
 
Combined Large Orchestras Small Orchestras 
Fundraising Expenditure Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
Lag(Fundraising Expend.) -0.07614 0.088095 -0.10606 0.146968 0.300825 0.116009 
Change(Investment Income) -0.00561 0.001325 -0.0056 0.002127 -0.023 0.020644 
Change(GS – federal) 0.007185 0.243047 0.017636 0.3999 0.378035 0.409826 
Change(GS – state) -0.15522 0.054434 -0.15589 0.09061 -0.16917 0.078416 
Change(GS – local) 0.023127 0.019622 0.023684 0.031507 0.096007 0.210995 
Constant 619144.3 48854.65 1582860 204152.7 86758.73 12052.79 




0.106   




0.923   




0.754   
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Table 3:  Regression Total Private Support 
          
               4-year 3-year IV-expfund 
PS - Total Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
GS - federal -1.451449 1.595289 2.32733 2.734013 1.807725 3.607537 
GS - state 0.3113283 0.3001389 0.2824944 0.5448659 0.3414974 0.8271594 
GS - local 2.312219 0.1643265 2.198038 0.183904 2.302161 0.2520087 
Investment Income 0.0503038 0.0091249 0.0434931 0.0100368 0.0740894 0.0252021 
Fundraising Expend. 0.2432754 0.3249933 0.0160494 0.3953001 -4.098584 2.778366 
Attendance 14.66107 5.74041 11.28099 7.53597 16.12693 10.79935 
% over age65 -1738412 1.20E+07 -3022142 2.24E+07 105270.2 3.22E+07 
% with MA degree 1050265 7406903 1170798 1.03E+07 2969654 1.54E+07 
Median income 62.11839 17.38572 93.14911 26.90709 103.9271 37.64441 
% free tickets 13826.51 303633.4 -71202.17 365670.9 -23733.58 556029.6 
Constant -571045.1 1366693 -1899830 2528377 -540636.5 3900547 










 R-sq:  overall 0.556   0.504   0.4157   























Table 4:  Regression Large Orchestras vs. Small Orchestras 
    
         
 
Large Orchestras Small Orchestras 
 
3-year IV-expfund 3-year IV-expfund 
PS - Total Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error 
GS - federal 3.956061 4.70745 3.197753 7.398184 -2.69484 3.475631 -8.99621 4.537096 
GS - state 0.335483 0.9352207 -0.616705 1.66785 0.079671 0.7047014 1.012427 1.018521 
GS - local 2.16683 0.3067383 2.296986 0.4948255 -0.57624 1.333088 -1.97896 1.760061 
Investment Income -0.028822 0.017516 -0.07928 0.0501862 -0.33292 0.1581629 -0.23182 0.247 
Fundraising Expend. -0.013118 0.7346766 -6.496526 5.465723 -0.1301 0.5048461 3.261772 2.233374 
Attendance 9.013215 13.30919 20.02862 22.63007 8.205796 7.2803 -13.4014 10.96744 
% over age65 -3.80E+07 8.09E+07 -5.53E+07 1.28E+08 -5223693 8668356 -453552 1.17E+07 
% with MA degree -2.42E+07 5.94E+07 -2.07E+07 9.28E+07 1770599 3758363 1081113 5156520 
Median income 298.1406 99.75405 319.6422 158.4332 25.92592 11.12045 12.53615 14.66435 
% free tickets -1127958 1535625 -678396.8 2387859 100458.8 140989 180255.1 204606.8 
Constant -2325402 9026268 7178468 1.64E+07 52431.64 1053503 101840.9 1372015 






0.163   






0.08   
R-sq:  overall 0.335   0.533   0.0017   0.076   
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Table 5A:  Private Support from various sources - Large Orchestras 
    
           
 
Total Individuals Business Foundations Other 
  Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
GS - federal 3.19775 7.398184 1.106285 3.12719 -1.12396 1.146233 -1.89782 7.09839 5.113245 2.572555 
GS - state -0.61671 1.66785 0.152883 0.70499 -0.15471 0.258407 -0.68269 1.60026 0.06781 0.579958 
GS - local 2.296987 0.494826 2.609164 0.20916 0.03359 0.076666 -0.495 0.47477 0.149232 0.172065 
Investment Inc. -0.07928 0.050186 -0.018063 0.02121 -0.00237 0.007776 -0.06216 0.04815 0.003311 0.017451 
Fundraising Exp. -6.49654 5.465723 -1.104306 2.31034 0.040369 0.846828 -7.26772 5.24423 1.835115 1.900584 
Attendance 20.02864 22.63007 5.957171 9.56565 0.227747 3.506175 27.15927 21.713 -13.3155 7.869107 
% over age65 -5.53E+07 1.28E+08 -5.18E+07 5.39E+07 -1.21E+07 1.98E+07 1.33E+07 1.22E+08 -4684281 4.44E+07 
% with MA  -2.07E+07 9.28E+07 1.42E+07 3.92E+07 1.00E+07 1.44E+07 3966966 8.90E+07 -4.88E+07 3.23E+07 
Median income 319.6422 158.4332 154.1528 66.9692 32.35194 24.54674 25.32134 152.013 107.8161 55.09163 
% free tickets -678396 2387859 919687.6 1009340 655385.9 369961.3 -3560178 2291095 1306709 830325 
Constant 7176187 1.64E+07 -211084.2 6943839 -183915 2545180 7429568 1.58E+07 141618.3 5712293 








0.3327   








0.3594   
R-sq:  overall 2.66E-01   0.0089   0.1141   0.1173   0.3634   
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Table 5B:  Private Support from various sources - Small Orchestras 
    
             Total Individuals Business Foundations Other 
  Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
GS - federal -8.99621 4.537096 -3.040811 2.15671 0.288467 0.575763 -3.728847 1.16936 -2.515 3.1572 
GS - state 1.012427 1.018521 0.1444331 0.48416 0.300386 0.129252 1.425055 0.26251 -0.8574 0.70875 
GS - local -1.97896 1.760061 -0.201938 0.83665 0.052631 0.223354 -0.659635 0.45363 -1.17 1.22476 
Investment Income -0.23182 0.247 -0.207553 0.11741 -0.03674 0.031345 -0.023322 0.06366 0.0358 0.17188 
Fundraising Expend. 3.261772 2.233374 2.124708 1.06164 -0.04611 0.283418 0.403954 0.57561 0.77922 1.55412 
Attendance -13.4014 10.96744 5.26496 5.21339 -0.2924 1.391781 2.242721 2.82667 -20.617 7.63183 
% over age65 -453552 1.17E+07 -229832.2 5577633 -342108 1489022 -318677.5 3024163 437065 8165050 
% with MA  1081113 5156520 2472401 2451158 287042.6 654368.6 -338665 1329005 -1E+06 3588229 
Median income 12.53615 14.66435 5.56391 6.97072 -0.80759 1.860924 5.20687 3.77949 2.57296 10.2044 
% free tickets 180255.1 204606.8 162581.8 97260.1 -8625.76 25964.85 -42088.79 52733.9 68387.9 142378 
Constant 101840.9 1372015 -438654.9 652189 221561.8 174110.4 -129405.4 353613 448340 954734 
R-sq:  within 0.1629   0.2511   0.0885   0.3334   0.1103   
R-sq:  between 0.2952   0.5099   0.0047   0.1868   0.1317   
R-sq:  overall 0.2387   0.4408   0.0037   0.2246   0.0589   
Number of obs. 222   222   222   222   222   







Table 6: Impact of Government Support on  
 Private Support - Direct + Indirect 
  
      
 
Large Orchestras 
     Total IND BUS FND OTH 
GS - federal 3.083176 1.086809 -1.12325 -2.026 5.145609 
GS - state 0.396046 0.325035 -0.161 0.450281 -0.21827 
GS - local 2.143126 2.58301 0.034546 -0.66713 0.192694 
Investment Income -0.04291 -0.01188 -0.00259 -0.02148 -0.00696 
      
 
Small Orchestras 
     Total IND BUS FND OTH 
GS - federal -7.76315 -2.2376 0.271034 -3.57614 -2.22044 
GS - state 0.460617 -0.21501 0.308187 1.356716 -0.98927 
GS - local -1.6658 0.002048 0.048204 -0.62085 -1.0952 
Investment Income -0.30684 -0.25642 -0.03568 -0.03261 0.017876 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
